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Comments of Richard J. Pierce, Jr. on Promoting the Rule of Law 
Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative 
Enforcement and Adjudication 
Docket Number OMB-2019-0006 
February 11, 2020 
Introduction 
 My name is Richard J. Pierce, Jr. I am submitting these comments as a teacher and scholar in the 
field of administrative law and government regulation. I am the Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law at 
George Washington University. I have taught, researched and written about administrative law and 
government regulation for over forty years. I have written over twenty books and over one hundred and 
thirty scholarly articles on the subject. My books and articles have been cited in hundreds of judicial 
opinions, including over a dozen opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. I can be reached at 
rpierce@law.gwu.edu or 703-304-1623. I have long been the author of the most frequently cited Treatise 
in the field of administrative law. I added Professor Kristin Hickman, Distinguished McKnight University 
Professor and Harlan Albert Rogers Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, as a co-author of the 
Sixth Edition that was published in 2019.    
 On January 30, 2020, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a Notice in which it 
announced that it wanted to identify “reforms that will ensure adequate due process in regulatory 
enforcement and adjudication” and that it was soliciting comments from the public to aid it in that 
process. 85 Fed. Reg. 5483. The Notice included eleven questions that OMB identified as “topics of 
interest” on which it invited feedback. I will comment primarily on four of those topics on which I have 
particular expertise—application of res judicata to agency adjudicative decisions, presumptions and 
burdens of proof in agency adjudications, evidentiary rules in agency adjudications, and the independence 
of agency adjudicators. I will begin, however, by making an important point that applies generally to the 
entire OMB effort to obtain useful input on the eleven points that OMB has identified. 
 The Notice states that: “Abstract, general principles will do little to advance actionable reform.” I 
agree. The Notice also states that OMB seeks “specific, concrete examples of current due process 
shortfalls.” That suggests that OMB is open to the possibility of relying on anecdotes as the basis for 
reforms. Anecdotes are potentially useful as means of illustrating a problem that has been identified and 
documented in a study. Anecdotes are worthless as evidence in support of the need to make a reform.  
 Changes in law can only be supported by studies. Studies rely on data and analysis to support 
findings. Courts regularly hold that an agency is only required to address and to respond to comments 
that are “well-supported” by data and analysis. See the cases discussed in Kristin Hickman & Richard 
Pierce, Treatise on Administrative Law §§5.4 and 10.4 (6th ed. 2019).  OMB should ignore anecdotes that 
are described in comments unless those anecdotes are supported by findings based on studies. 
 Each of the issues on which OMB has requested comments has been the subject of numerous 




States (ACUS). ACUS is a federal agency that studies the ways in which agencies make decisions and 
recommends reforms in agency procedures. ACUS has one hundred and one members who vote on 
whether to make recommendations based on the studies it sponsors. Fifty of the members are experts on 
administrative law who work for the federal government. Forty of the members are experts in 
administrative law who are employed in the private sector. Ten are members of a Council that has the 
power to veto a recommendation. One member is the Chairman. The Chairman and the members of the 
Council are appointed by the President.      
Most ACUS recommendations are approved by a unanimous vote of the members. Before ACUS 
votes on recommendations for reform, it commissions a comprehensive study of a practice that is a 
candidate for reform. The study is completed by one or more consultants who are chosen because of their 
expertise on the issues to be studied. The consultant submits his or her report, along with draft 
recommendations for reform, to an ACUS committee that consists of public and private members and at 
least one Council member. The committee then meets to discuss the report and proposed 
recommendations.  Typically, the committee meets several times for many hours to discuss the report 
and proposed recommendations. The committee then submits its proposed report and recommendations 
to the Council, which has the power to amend the recommendations and often exercises that power. The 
amended proposed recommendations are then presented to the entire membership of ACUS at a semi-
annual plenary conference. Additional amendments are often made at the plenary. The proposed 
recommendations are adopted only if the membership votes to approve the recommendations. Most 
ACUS decisions are unanimous. 
ACUS has performed the functions of studying the administrative process and recommending 
reforms in that process since 1964. Its members and consultants have included virtually every nationally 
recognized expert on government regulation and the administrative process. Thus, for instance, Antonin 
Scalia was Chairman of ACUS before he became a Supreme Court Justice. In Congressional testimony, 
Justice Scalia referred to ACUS as “one of the best bargains for the buck” in the federal government. The 
ACUS website has tens of thousands of pages of studies of every “topic of interest” that OMB has 
identified in its Notice. I urge OMB to begin its consideration of potential reforms of the administrative 
adjudication process by reading the reports that are readily accessible on the ACUS website. 
I. Res Judicata 
 OMB asked: “Would applying the principle of res judicata in the regulatory context reduce 
duplicative proceedings? How would agencies effectively apply res judicata?” 
 My answer: As I describe and document in detail in my Treatise, res judicata has long applied to 
agency decisions made in adjudications, and collateral estoppel has long applied to agency findings of fact 
made in adjudications if the agency used procedures that courts consider adequate. Kristin Hickman & 
Richard Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §15.3 (6th ed. 2019). It is as easy to apply res judicata and 
collateral estoppel to agency adjudicative decisions as it is to apply those doctrines to judicial decisions.  
There is one difference between the application of collateral estoppel to agency decisions and the 
application of collateral estoppel to judicial decisions. As I explain in detail in my Treatise, collateral 
estoppel does not apply against the government on an issue of law. Kristin Hickman & Richard Pierce, 
Administrative Law Treatise §15.4 (6th ed. 2019). The Supreme Court has refused to apply collateral 




multiple circuit courts before they come before the Supreme Court, and it wants agencies to apply federal 
law in a uniform manner across the country to the extent that the regional structure of the federal courts 
permits. 
II. Presumptions and Burdens of Proof  
 OMB asked: “In the regulatory/civil context, when does an American have to prove an absence of 
legal liability? Put differently, need an American prove innocence in regulatory proceeding(s)? What 
reform(s) would ensure an American never has to prove the absence of liability? To the extent permissible, 
should the Administration address burdens of persuasion and /or production in regulatory proceedings? 
Or should the scope of this reform focus strictly on an initial presumption of innocence?” 
 My answer: There is no presumption of innocence in any civil proceeding either in court or at an 
agency. The presumption of innocence applies only in criminal proceedings. No agency has the power to 
adjudicate a criminal case. Only the Department of Justice can initiate a criminal case, and a criminal case 
can only be adjudicated in a court. 
 The law governing burden of proof and presumptions is the same in civil proceedings in court and 
in agency adjudications. No one must prove absence of liability in any regulatory proceeding. The 
proponent of a change in the status quo bears the burden of proof in agency adjudications. Thus, the 
agency bears the burden of proof in an enforcement proceeding.  
 Courts sometimes shift the burden of production on an issue from the proponent to another party 
if there is reason to believe that the other party has unique access to the evidence that is relevant to the 
resolution of the issue. In most such cases the proponent continues to bear the risk of non-persuasion. I 
am not aware of any context in which agencies engage in this practice. 
 As in civil cases in court, a presumption can have the effect of changing the burden of proof in 
agency adjudications. Presumptions are based on correlations coupled with problems in obtaining direct 
evidence on an issue. Thus, for instance, if we know that fact X is almost invariably true when fact Y is 
true, and we know that it is much more difficult to obtain evidence relevant to the existence of fact X than 
it is to obtain evidence relevant to the existence of fact Y, we presume the existence of fact X when the 
party with the burden of proof proves that fact Y exists. 
 Most presumptions in both civil cases in court and in agency adjudications are rebuttable. Thus, 
in my example, if the party with the burden of proof proves the existence of fact Y, the other party then 
has the burden of proving the non-existence of fact X. In some cases in both civil cases in court and in 
agency proceedings, the presumption is irrebuttable, i.e., if the party who has the burden of proof proves 
the existence of fact Y, fact X must be found to be true. 
 An agency does not have the power to change the burden of proof or to create presumptions of 
any type in an adjudication unless Congress has specifically authorized the agency to do so. 5 U.S.C. 
§556(d) provides: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the 
burden of proof.” Congress sometimes authorizes an agency to use the notice and comment rulemaking 





Thus, for instance, when the FAA decides whether to issue or renew the license of an elderly 
commercial passenger aircraft pilot, it must decide whether age has had such an adverse effect on the 
pilot’s health that issuing or renewing the pilot’s license would impose an undue risk on the flying public. 
That determination is so difficult to make in a timely and accurate manner in the thousands of cases in 
which the agency must make it every year, that FAA has always relied on an irrebuttable presumption 
based on age.  
For decades, FAA applied the “age sixty rule” that it adopted through use of the notice and 
comment process. The “age sixty rule” prohibited anyone over the age of sixty from obtaining or renewing 
a license to pilot a commercial passenger aircraft.  The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 conferred on the FAA 
the power to determine by rule the qualifications to fly a commercial aircraft. The FAA adopted the age 
sixty rule to implement the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.  
The age sixty rule was challenged in numerous cases, but courts always upheld it based on the 
evidence that FAA provided.  That evidence demonstrated that there was a powerful correlation between 
unacceptable health risks to pilots and a pilot’s age once the pilot reaches the age of sixty, and that FAA 
could not possibly conduct all of the hearings required to make timely and accurate determinations that 
each of thousands of pilots over the age of sixty has a health state that enables him to pilot commercial 
passenger aircraft with acceptable risks to the public. See e.g., Yetman v. Garvey, 261 F. 3d 664 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
In 2007, Congress enacted a statute that eliminated the absolute prohibition on renewing the 
license of a pilot over the age of sixty and allowed pilots over sixty but under sixty-five to renew their 
licenses subject to strict conditions, e.g., a plane must have at least one pilot under the age of sixty in the 
cockpit at all times, and pilots over sixty must pass a comprehensive physical examination every six 
months. Fair Treatment of Experienced Pilots Act, Pub. L. No. 110-135. The statute also created a new 
irrebuttable presumption that renders all applicants to obtain or to renew a license to pilot a commercial 
passenger aircraft ineligible once they reach the age of sixty-five. Congress found that the changes it made 
by statute in 2007 were desirable partly because of advances in our ability to evaluate the health state of 
elderly pilots and partly because other countries and international aviation authorities had changed their 
rules by replacing sixty with sixty-five as the maximum age for eligibility to obtain or renew a license to 
pilot a commercial passenger aircraft. 
III. Rules of Evidence 
 OMB asked: “What evidentiary rules apply in regulatory proceedings to guard against hearsay 
and/or weigh reliability and relevance. Would the application of the Federal Rules of Evidence create a 
fairer evidentiary framework, and if so, which rules?” 
 My answer: I have taught and written about the Federal Rules of Evidence for forty-three years. I 
have also devoted countless hours to the study of the specific questions that OMB asks. 
A. The Federal Rules of Evidence Are Designed for Use in Jury Trials 
 The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) are extremely long and complicated. They have no application 
to agency adjudications. By contrast the rules of evidence applicable to agency adjudications are short: 
“Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency, as a matter of policy shall provide 




agencies are required by statute to apply the FRE “so far as practicable,” and a few have adopted that 
standard in their rules of procedure. 
 I conducted a comprehensive study of the question of what rules of evidence agencies should use 
in my role as a consultant for ACUS. The report of the results of that study is available at 1986 ACUS 133 
(1986), and 39 Administrative Law Review 1 (1987). See also Kristin Hickman & Richard Pierce, 
Administrative Law Treatise Chapter 9 (6th ed. 2019). On the basis of my report, and after a great deal of 
study and discussion in committee meetings and during the plenary, ACUS made several unanimous 
recommendations. Those recommendations are reported at 1986 ACUS 6 and were published at 51 Fed. 
Reg. 25642. 
 ACUS unanimously recommended that agencies should not use the FRE with or without the 
qualifier “so far as practicable.” ACUS recommended that agencies should use only the rule of evidence 
stated at 5 U.S.C. §556(d), with the addition of FRE 403, the rule that authorizes a court to exclude 
evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence.” 
 The reason for the ACUS recommendation is easy to understand. The FRE are designed for use in 
jury trials. They reflect our ambivalence about the institution of jury trial. The high regard we have for the 
jury is reflected in our inclusion of the right to jury trial in both civil and criminal cases in the Sixth and 
Seventh Amendments of the Constitution. On the other hand, we distrust the ability of jurors to use their 
cognitive skills to make findings based on evidence, and we fear that they will instead make decisions that 
are based on emotional responses to evidence that has low probative value but high emotional impact. 
The psychology literature includes many studies that provide a basis for this fear. 
 Juries are arresponsible decision makers. Once jurors are exposed to some item of evidence we 
have no way of knowing whether or to what extent their decision making was influenced by evidence that 
has low probative value and high emotional impact. The only way that we can be sure that jurors do not 
act on the basis of such evidence is by precluding them from becoming aware of such evidence by 
excluding it. 
 By contrast, agencies are responsible decision makers. Agencies and the Administrative Law 
Judges (ALJs) who preside in agency hearings are required to explain why they take an action in an 
adjudication, including the findings of fact on which they base the action and the evidence they considered 
in the process of making those findings. There is no reason to use the complicated and crude proxies for 
reliability that are reflected in the FRE at the point of the decision to admit evidence. If an ALJ relies on 
unreliable evidence as the basis for a finding it is easy for the agency to detect the error and correct it in 
the process of reviewing the ALJ’s findings. If an agency errs and relies on unreliable evidence as the basis 
for a finding it is easy for a reviewing court to detect that error in the process of evaluating the quality of 
the evidence on which the agency relied in making its findings of fact. 
 It bears noting that neither the FRE nor the evidentiary rules that apply to agencies codify any of 
the many privileges that protect some important forms of evidence from public disclosure in a court or 
agency proceeding. The common law of privileges, with some additions that have been created by statute, 




agency can admit evidence that falls within the scope of the attorney-client privilege or any of the 
privileges, such as executive privilege, that apply to some government documents and communications. 
B. Admissibility of Hearsay 
 The FRE prohibit the admission of hearsay evidence subject to thirty-one complicated exceptions, 
including a residual exception that allows a federal judge to admit hearsay evidence if the judge 
determines that it has “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” that are “equivalent” to the 
trustworthiness of evidence that is admissible under any of the thirty exceptions that are described with 
particularity. By contrast, agencies are allowed to admit hearsay evidence subject to judicial review that 
assures that any hearsay evidence on which the agency relies is trustworthy and reliable.  
The Supreme Court announced the rules applicable to agency reliance on hearsay in Richardson 
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). An applicant for Social Security disability benefits applied for benefits and 
presented only the testimony of his doctor, a general practitioner, in support of his application. The Social 
Security Administration (SSA) required the applicant to be examined by five other doctors, each of whom 
was a board-certified specialist in a field relevant to the disabilities that the applicant alleged. Social 
Security disability benefits are available only to applicants who have disabilities that are so severe that it 
is impossible for them to perform the functions required to hold any job that is available in significant 
numbers in the economy. 
Each of the five specialists examined the applicant and subjected him to the diagnostic tests 
relevant to determining whether he had the disabilities that were the basis for his claim. Each submitted 
a report to the SSA in which he expressed the opinion that the applicant did not have the disabilities that 
he claimed to have. Each report described the diagnostic procedures that the doctor used and reported 
the results of those procedures.   
At a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) the applicant presented the oral testimony 
of his doctor. The doctor expressed his opinion that the applicant was disabled but he did not support his 
opinion by reference to any diagnostic procedures. The record before the ALJ included the written reports 
of the five specialists to whom the SSA had referred the applicant. Each explained in detail why the doctor 
was of the opinion that the applicant did not suffer from the disabilities that he claimed as the basis for 
his application. The applicant did not ask the ALJ to subpoena any of those doctors to enable him to cross-
examine them. The ALJ denied the application based on his finding that the applicant did not suffer from 
disabilities so severe that he could not perform the functions required to hold any job that is available in 
significant quantities.   
In that context, the Supreme Court upheld the SSA decision. The Court held that reliable hearsay 
can form the basis for a finding of fact that supports an agency decision even if the hearsay evidence is 
the only evidence that supports the finding and if the only non-hearsay evidence in the record purports 
to contradict the reliable hearsay evidence that supports the agency finding. The Court emphasized, 
however, that hearsay evidence must be reliable to support an agency finding and that the private party 
did not attempt to persuade the ALJ to subpoena the sources of the hearsay evidence so that the applicant 
could confront and cross-examine the sources. 
All agencies are bound by the Supreme Court’s holding in Richardson v. Perales. Thus, an agency 




ask the ALJ to subpoena the source of the hearsay to allow the private party to confront and cross-examine 
the source. 
C. The Difference Between Formal Adjudication and Informal Adjudication  
 The procedures that an agency must use in a formal adjudication are described in detail in 5 U.S.C. 
§§554-557. Those procedures are virtually identical to the procedures used by a federal court in a civil 
case. A party has the right to notice of the issues raised and the remedies sought by the agency. It has a 
right to a hearing before an ALJ in which it can present oral evidence and can cross-examine opposing 
witnesses. A party also can ask the ALJ to subpoena additional witnesses and to authorize the party to 
take depositions. An ALJ must issue a subpoena “on a showing of general relevance and reasonable scope 
of the evidence sought,” 5 U.S.C. §555(d), and an ALJ must allow a deposition “when the ends of justice 
would be served.” 5 U.S.C. §556(c) (4).   
Those statutory provisions also provide a large number of safeguards of the rights of private 
parties that are virtually identical to the safeguards that are available in a civil proceeding in a federal 
court. Thus, for instance, no one is allowed to communicate with the ALJ off the record; 5 U.S.C. 
§§554(d)(1),557(d(1); an agency cannot discipline an ALJ, 5 U.S.C. §7521; an agency cannot determine the 
compensation of an ALJ, 5 U.S.C. §5372; an agency cannot assign an ALJ any duties that are inconsistent 
with the duties of an ALJ and must assign cases to ALJs in rotation, 5 U.S.C. §3105; and, an agency cannot 
subject an ALJ to supervision or direction by any agency employee who engages in the performance of 
investigative or prosecuting functions, 5 U.S.C. §554(d)(2).  
After a hearing ends and the parties submit their briefs, the ALJ is required to write an opinion in 
which he states and explains all of his findings of fact and conclusions of law. 5 U.S.C. §557(c)(3). All 
regulatory agencies have procedures through which a decision of an ALJ can be appealed to a higher 
authority in the agency. “On appeal from or review of the initial decision [of the ALJ] the agency has all 
the powers which it would have in making the initial decision  .  .   .   .” 5 U.S.C. §557(b). Once the agency 
takes a final action, its action can be reviewed by a court at the request of any person who is “adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action  .   .   .   .” 5 U.S.C. §702. 
An agency must use formal adjudication when a statute authorizes the agency to act “on the 
record after opportunity for agency hearing,” the agency proposes to revoke, amend, suspend or 
condition a license,  or a statute requires the agency to act in accordance with 5 U.S.C. §§556 and 557. 5 
U.S.C. §§554(a), 558(c). Statutes that authorize an agency to impose a significant penalty require the 
agency to use formal adjudication. The Clean Water Act is typical. It requires EPA to use formal 
adjudication in any proceeding in which it seeks a penalty in excess of $10,000. 33 U.S.C. §1319 (g)(2). 
If an agency has the power to adjudicate a dispute and the statute it is implementing does not 
require it to use formal adjudication, it has the discretion to use informal adjudication. Agencies have 
more discretion with respect to the details of the procedures they use in an informal adjudication. The 
agency must comply with 5 U.S.C. §555, but that statutory provision provides for only a few procedural 
rights. In some cases, the statute that authorizes the agency to conduct the adjudication imposes other 
procedural requirements. If an agency action has the potential to deprive anyone of “life, liberty, or 
property,” the agency must provide the party who is the subject of the proceeding with all of the 




chapter 7 (6th ed. 2019). All enforcement proceedings are subject to due process. Agencies must describe 
the procedures they use in their rules. 
Studies of the ways in which agencies conduct informal adjudications have found that agencies 
always provide notice of the issues presented, an opportunity to provide data and arguments either in 
written or oral form, a decision by a neutral decision maker, and a statement of reasons for the decision. 
Many agencies add a variety of other procedural safeguards. Michael Asimow, Evidentiary Hearings 
Outside of the Administrative Procedure Act: Final Report, Administrative Conference of the United States 
(2016); Paul Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 739 (1976). See also 
Kristin Hickman & Richard Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise chapter six (6th ed. 2019). 
D. Oral Hearings Versus Written Hearings                                                                                                                                                                         
  Until 1973, many people assumed that when Congress required an agency to act after a “hearing” 
it intended to require the agency to provide an oral evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court corrected 
that assumption in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S. 224 (1973). The Court held that 
an agency can comply with the requirement to provide a hearing in many circumstances by providing an 
opportunity for a written exchange of data and arguments. The facts of the Florida East Coast case 
illustrate such a circumstance. 
 Congress enacted a statute in which it told the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to issue a 
rule to solve a serious problem. Every year at the time that grain was harvested in the midwest some of 
the grain rotted because there were not enough rail cars available to transport all of the grain to market. 
Congress told the ICC to issue a rule to address the problem after first conducting a “hearing.” The ICC 
issued a public notice in which it described the problem, proposed to solve it by imposing a per diem 
penalty on the owner of any rail siding outside the grain harvesting area that had in its possession a rail 
car suitable for carrying grain during the grain harvesting season. The ICC solicited comments on the 
proposed rule. 
 After receiving and considering the comments, but without holding an oral evidentiary hearing, 
the ICC issued the rule in which it adopted the proposed penalty on railroads that had rail cars suitable 
for use in hauling grain in their possession outside the grain harvesting area during the grain harvesting 
season. Some railroads challenged the validity of the rule in court by arguing that the agency had not 
conducted the oral evidentiary hearing that they believed that Congress had required. The petitioners 
argued that, when a statute requires a “hearing” and when there are contested issues of fact, the agency 
must conduct an oral evidentiary hearing to resolve the contested issues of fact. 
 The Supreme Court rejected that argument. It held that “hearing” is an ambiguous term that can 
refer to many different types of procedures to resolve disputes. The Court concluded that the ICC 
complied with the statutory duty to conduct a “hearing” in the case before the Court by providing an 
opportunity for interested parties to submit evidence and arguments in a written form.  
The Court based its decision on two factors. First, the action the agency took was the issuance of 
a rule that affects many firms, rather than the issuance of an order in an adjudication that singles out a 
firm for adverse treatment based on the actions or characteristics of the firm. The Court repeated the 
statement of principle it first stated in 1915 in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 




that everyone should have a voice in its adoption.   .   .   . There must be a limit to individual argument in 
such matters if government is to go on.” Second, the Court based its decision on the nature of the disputed 
facts. Oral evidentiary hearings may be appropriate to resolve contested issues of fact like who did what 
when, where, and why. They are not essential to resolve issues of general fact of the type the ICC 
considered as the basis for its rule: what kinds of rail cars can carry grain; how many of those cars exist in 
the country, where are they during the grain harvesting season, and how can the ICC create incentives to 
persuade the people who have possession of the cars to ensure that they are in the grain harvesting region 
at the time the grain is harvested? 
Immediately after the Court decided Florida East Coast, circuit courts adopted different 
interpretations of the decision. Some courts interpreted it to permit agencies to use written hearings only 
in rulemakings, while others interpreted it to permit agencies to use written hearings in any case in which 
the agency must resolve only disputes with respect to general facts of the type the ICC resolved in the 
process of issuing its per diem rule. Over time, all of the circuits adopted the latter interpretation, 
culminating with the First Circuit’s decision in Dominion Brayton Point v. Johnson, 443 F. 3d 12 (1st Cir. 
2006). The circuit court overruled a circuit precedent and held that the EPA could use a paper hearing to 
decide whether to issue a discharge permit under the Clean Water Act. By then all circuits agreed that 
agencies could decide contested issues of general fact more accurately and in much less time through use 
of a paper hearing than through use of an oral evidentiary hearing. See Kristin Hickman & Richard Pierce, 
Administrative Law Treatise §6.2 (6th ed. 2019).  
E. Reliance on Scientific Studies 
 A recent Supreme Court decision creates a risk that agencies will be too willing to rely on 
unsupported expert testimony and untested studies as the basis for findings of fact in adjudications. I 
have described and criticized that decision in Pierce, Has the Supreme Court Endorsed the Use of Junk 
Science in the Administrative State? The Regulatory Review (Apr. 29, 2019) and Is the Court Encouraging 
Agencies to Rely on Junk Science? Biestek v. Berryhill, On the Docket, George Washington Law Review (Apr. 
23, 2019). 
The six-Justice majority opinion in Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1128 (2019),  can be interpreted 
as an invitation to agencies to make important decisions based on junk science, i.e., opinions of putative 
experts that are not supported by reliable data or analysis. I hope that agencies and lower courts resist 
that interpretation of the case, but it is an entirely plausible interpretation. 
The facts of Biestek are simple. Biestek applied for Social Security disability benefits. At a hearing 
before an ALJ Biestek claimed that he was so disabled that he could not perform the functions required 
by any job that is available in significant numbers in the U.S. economy. 
In such a hearing the applicant has the burden of proving his health state, while the government 
has the burden of proving the availability of a significant number of jobs that can be performed by 
someone with the age, education, experience and health state of the applicant. The Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) attempted to prove the availability of jobs that Biestek could perform by 
introducing the testimony of a vocational expert. The witness testified that there were 120,000 jobs 




Biestek’s lawyer asked the witness to describe the basis for the remarkably specific number of 
jobs of each type that the witness claimed to be available. The witness referred to two sources—the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) and private surveys the witness had conducted for other clients. Since 
BLS does not report job availability statistics with the specificity required to support the number of jobs 
of a particular type the witness claimed to be available, the only possible basis for those numbers were 
the private surveys. 
Biestek’s lawyer asked the witness to provide the private surveys. The witness refused on the 
basis that they were part of her confidential client files. Biestek’s lawyer then asked the witness to provide 
redacted versions of the surveys that excluded any client-specific information. The witness should have 
been prepared to comply with that request. SSA’s Vocational Expert Handbook instructs witnesses to 
“have available, at the hearing, any vocational resource materials that you are likely to rely upon” because 
“the ALJ may ask you to provide relevant portions of [those] materials.” 
We will never know whether the witness had a redacted version of the surveys with her because 
the ALJ then interrupted the cross-examination and stated that he would not require the witness to 
provide a redacted version of the surveys. The ALJ then relied solely on the testimony of the vocational 
witness as the basis for his decision to deny Biestek’s application for benefits based on his finding that 
there were a significant number of jobs available that Biestek could perform. 
Of course, we will also never know whether the private surveys exist. If they exist, we will never 
know whether they support the witness’s testimony. If they support the witness’s testimony, we will never 
know whether they are based on reliable data. If they are supported by reliable data, we will never know 
whether the methodology the witness used to draw inferences from the data was reliable. 
No court would admit evidence of the type the ALJ relied on as the basis for his critical finding 
that there are a significant number of jobs that Biestek can perform. If a district court admitted evidence 
of that type and relied on it as the basis for a finding in a bench trial, its decision would be summarily 
reversed on appeal. 
In its famous opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993),the 
Supreme Court took a major step toward assuring that our legal system functions on the basis of sound 
scientific principles. The Court held that judges must apply criteria based on sound scientific principles 
when they decide whether to admit expert testimony. Daubert was a reaction to the well-documented 
problem of court decisions that are based on “junk science.” That term refers to opinions offered in 
evidence by supposed experts that were not supported by reliable data and analysis but that often were 
the basis for jury verdicts before the Court decided Daubert. 
Daubert requires an expert witness to disclose to the court and to opposing counsel the data and 
methodology the expert relied on as the basis for any opinion the expert proposes to offer in court. The 
judge is then assigned the task of deciding whether the data and methodology are sufficiently reliable to 
support a decision to admit the expert’s testimony. If the reliability of the data or methodology is 
challenged by opposing counsel, the judge conducts a voir dire hearing during which opposing counsel 
have the opportunity to test the reliability of the data and methodology by cross-examining the witness. 
No expert witness is permitted to testify unless the witness has disclosed the data and methodology that 




Three Justices expressed the view that the ALJ’s decision to deny Biestek’s application for 
disability benefits based solely on the totally unsupported testimony of the vocational expert should be 
reversed for all of the same reasons that any court would reverse the decision of a district judge in similar 
circumstances. Unfortunately, they had to express that view in dissenting opinions. 
The majority upheld the ALJ’s decision. The majority held that the ALJ’s finding was conclusive 
because it was supported by substantial evidence. The majority reasoned that the ALJ could rely on the 
unsupported opinion of the witness and deny Biestek access to all of the means through which he could 
challenge that testimony for two reasons—the evidence satisfied the substantial evidence test, and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) do not apply to SSA disability hearings. The first reason is based on a 
misunderstanding of the substantial evidence test, while the second is based on a misunderstanding of 
the reasons why Congress decided that the FRE do not apply to agency hearings. 
The majority argued that it would make no sense to conclude that an expert witness’s opinion 
qualifies as substantial evidence when no one asks the expert to provide the data and analysis to support 
the opinion but that it does not qualify as substantial evidence when someone asks for the supporting 
data and analysis and the witness refuses to comply with the request. That reasoning is inconsistent with 
the Court’s well-reasoned opinion in Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951): “The 
substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” 
A refusal to provide support for an expert opinion clearly detracts from its weight. 
The inapplicability of the FRE to agency hearings is unrelated to the wisdom of the Court’s decision 
in Daubert to keep juries from deciding cases based on junk science. The substantive reasoning in Daubert 
is equally applicable to agency hearings. Like juries, agencies should not be allowed to make decisions 
based on junk science. The difference in context bears only on the mechanism that courts can and should 
use to implement the Daubert principle. In the context of a jury trial, the Daubert criteria must be applied 
at the time that an expert opinion is offered in evidence. In the context of an agency hearing, the Daubert 
criteria can be applied in the process of judicial review of the stated basis for an agency’s decision to rely 
on expert testimony as the basis for a finding. 
The FRE are designed for application in jury trials. They are essential in that context because juries 
are not required to state reasons for their decisions. Thus, if we want to ensure that juries do not make 
decisions based on unreliable evidence, we must preclude them from having access to the types of 
evidence that are likely to be unreliable. The FRE are not appropriate for application in agency hearings 
because agencies must give reasons for their findings of fact. Thus, if an ALJ admits evidence that the ALJ 
later determines to be unreliable, the ALJ can decline to rely on it as the basis for a finding. If an ALJ 
erroneously relies on unreliable evidence as the basis for a finding, a reviewing court can detect the error 
and reject the finding as not supported by substantial evidence. 
The Biestek majority referred to the credentials and reputation of an expert witness as an 
adequate independent basis to conclude that the opinions of the expert are sufficiently reliable to support 
a finding of fact even if the expert refuses to provide anyone access to the data and analysis that she relies 
on to support her opinion. That is a dangerous method of reasoning that is inconsistent with Daubert. 
The Daubert Court did not indulge the naïve assumption that a putative expert should be believed 
because she has impressive credentials and an impeccable reputation. There is a mountain of evidence 




Dartmouth and Sloan Kettering were forced to announce that some of their top researchers had 
committed academic fraud in conducting some of the most important studies that those prestigious 
institutions have produced. See Benedict Carey, Prominent Cancer Researcher Resigns from 
Dartmouth Amid Plagiarism Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2018); Gina Kolata, He Promised to 
Restore Damaged Hearts. Harvard Says His Lab Fabricated Research, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018); 
Anahad O’Connor, More Evidence that Nutrition Studies Don’t Always Add Up: A Cornell Food 
Scientist’s Downfall Could Reveal a Bigger Problem in Nutrition Research, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 
2018); Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, Top Cancer Researcher Fails to Disclose Corporate 
Financial Ties in Major Research Journals, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018). 
Attempts to replicate the findings of hundreds of important studies have produced powerful 
circumstantial evidence that academic fraud in conducting studies is a widespread problem. Thus, for 
instance, four attempts to replicate the findings of hundreds of studies published in prestigious journals 
found that only 36% to 67% of the findings could be replicated using the data and methodology that the 
researchers claimed to have used. Colin F. Camerer et al., Evaluating the Replicability of Social Science 
Experiments in Nature and Science Between 2010 and 2015, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV., 637 (2018). It is 
fair to infer that the other 33% to 64% of the findings were the product of either academic fraud or 
incompetence. 
Academic fraud can be extremely costly to society. The measles epidemic that now afflicts the 
nation is the result of an academic fraud that took place over twenty years ago. A team of twelve 
distinguished researchers published a study in 1998 in Lancet, the most prestigious British medical journal, 
in which they reported the results of a study of the relationship between vaccines and autism. A.J. 
Wakefield et al., Ileal-lymphoid-nodular Hyperplasia, Non-specific Colitis, and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder in Children, 351 THE LANCET 637–41 (1998). They found a correlation 
between taking a vaccine and autism so high that the lead author used the finding as the basis for an 
international speaking tour in which he warned that vaccines cause autism. 
The vaccine/autism study was a fraud perpetrated by the lead author, who was well paid by 
attorneys who wanted to have access to a study they could use in lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers. 
The fraud was not detected and publicly disclosed until 2011, however. Each of scores of studies 
conducted since 1998 have found no relationship between vaccines and autism. See The Coll. of 
Physicians of Philadelphia, Do Vaccines Cause Autism? THE HISTORY OF VACCINES (Jan. 25, 2019).  The 
fraudulent 1998 study caused a dramatic decrease in the proportion of the population of parents who 
vaccinate their children, however, and a corresponding increase in the number of children who suffer 
from a variety of potentially lethal communicable diseases like measles. Some parents still cling stubbornly 
to the belief that was instilled by the fraudulent study, with adverse effects on vulnerable populations all 
over the world. 
We need to act aggressively to reduce the risk of damage caused by junk science. Daubert was an 
important step in the right direction. Biestek was an unfortunate step in the wrong direction. 
The dissenting Justices expressed the hope that lower courts will not interpret the majority 
opinion as an invitation to uphold all uses of junk science by agencies. They suggested that the majority 
opinion might be just the first step of many in which the majority will provide agencies and courts with 




The reasoning in the majority opinion can be interpreted narrowly. At the end of its opinion, the 
majority stated that it was only rejecting a “categorical rule” that the petitioner’s lawyer had urged the 
Court to adopt. It went on to disavow any intent to decide “whether, in the absence of that rule, 
substantial evidence supported the ALJ in denying [Biestek] benefits.” 
I hope the optimism of the dissenting Justices proves to be accurate, but it would be easy for 
lower courts to interpret the majority opinion as an invitation to allow agencies to rely on junk science in 
virtually all cases. The Court needs to follow Biestek with a series of opinions in which it makes it clear 
that an agency can rely on the unsupported opinion of a putative expert only in rare circumstances in 
which the agency has no other viable option and the agency has good reasons to excuse the expert from 
providing support for the opinion. 
F. Judicial Review 
 The tests that courts must apply in the process of reviewing agency actions are set forth in 5 
U.S.C. §706:     
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the 
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall--(1) compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-- 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or 
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the 
reviewing court. 
 
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. 
 
The substantial evidence test applies to judicial review of all findings of fact made in formal 
adjudications. Congress based the test on a 1913 Supreme Court opinion: Interstate Commerce 
Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913). The Supreme Court described and 
explained the test in NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939): 
 
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion of 
the existence of the fact to be established. ‘It means such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and it must be 
enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the 
conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.  
 
The Court added an important component to the definition of the term in Universal Camera 




                                   
The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly 
detracts from its weight. 
The arbitrary and capricious test also applies to findings of fact made in formal adjudications. As 
a result of the combination of the two tests, an agency must explain why it chose to rely on some evidence 
instead of conflicting evidence when it makes a finding in a formal adjudication. See Kristin Hickman & 
Richard Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §10.2.2 (6th ed. 2019). The history, interpretations and 
applications of the substantial evidence test are described in detail in Kristin Hickman & Richard Pierce, 
Administrative Law Treatise §10.2 (6th ed. 2019). 
The arbitrary and capricious test applies to judicial review of findings of fact made by agencies in 
informal adjudications. There is a difference of opinion among judges on the question whether the 
arbitrary and capricious test is identical to the substantial evidence test, as then-judge Antonin Scalia 
concluded in Ass’n of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 745 F. 2d  677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984), or whether the substantial evidence test is “arguably more 
stringent” than the arbitrary and capricious test as the Tenth Circuit said in Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit 
Corp., 42 F. 3d 1560, 1575 (10th Cir. 1994). The debate among judges and many of the applications of the 
arbitrary and capricious test to agency findings of fact adopted in informal adjudications are discussed in 
Kristin Hickman & Richard Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §10.4 (6th ed. 2019). 
IV. Independent Adjudicators 
  
OMB asked: “Do adjudicators sometimes lack independence from the enforcement arm of the 
agency? What reform[s] would adequately separate functions and guarantee an adjudicator’s 
independence?” 
My answer: Congress enacted a statute in 1946 that ensured that adjudicators have adequate 
decisional independence. Recent decisions by the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice and the 
President have the effect of jeopardizing the decisional independence of adjudicators.    
The Supreme Court has consistently held that due process requires an unbiased decision maker 
in any adjudication in which the government has the potential to deprive an individual or a corporation 
of life, liberty or property. Due process and the requirement of a neutral decision maker apply to all agency 
enforcement proceeding. The major cases that announce and apply the requirement of a neutral decision 
maker are described in Kristin Hickman & Richard Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §7.7 (6th ed. 2019). 
A. The Solution Adopted by Congress in 1946 
Congress studied and debated the question of how best to assure that agency adjudicators are 
unbiased for fifteen years, ultimately leading to the unanimous decision of both Houses of Congress to 
adopt the solution that is reflected in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. The question was difficult 
to answer because there is a potential conflict between the independence of agency adjudicators that is 
required by due process and the responsibility that Article II of the constitution imposes on the president 




During the 1930s and 1940s, Congress devoted a great deal of time and effort to crafting 
legislation to govern actions taken by federal agencies. After fifteen years of debates and studies, 
Congress unanimously enacted the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA). See George Shepherd, 
Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 N.W. U.L. Rev.  
1557 (1996). 
One of the core issues that Congress resolved when it enacted the APA was the status of the 
hearing examiners who were authorized to preside over oral evidentiary hearings in adjudications in the 
common situation in which the head of the agency did not personally preside. That issue was challenging 
because Congress sought to accomplish two potentially competing goals.          
Members of Congress had received many complaints that the hearing examiners who presided in 
agency hearings prior to enactment of the APA were biased in favor of the agency and against the private 
parties who participated in those hearings. See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 
128, 131-132 (1953). Congress responded to that concern by conferring on the new hearing examiners 
who would preside after enactment of the APA a high degree of independence from the agencies for 
which they worked. Id. at 132-134.   
Congress also wanted to further the potentially conflicting goal of ensuring that the agencies 
themselves would retain control of policy decisions in implementing their statutory directions. Congress 
recognized that hearing examiners who were sufficiently independent of the agency that employed them 
to reduce concerns of bias had the potential to usurp some of the policymaking power Congress had 
conferred on their agencies by the manner in which they resolved adjudications that they heard. Congress 
responded by including in the APA provisions that ensure that agencies retain the ability to make all of 
the policy decisions that might be raised in an adjudication in which a hearing examiner presides. See Paul 
Verkuil et al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary, Admin. Conf. of the United States, Recommendations 
and Reports, Vol. II, 770, 801-802 (1992).   
During its fifteen years of deliberation about what became the APA, Congress considered many 
potential ways of reconciling the tension between those two potentially conflicting goals. Congress 
eventually settled on a combination of statutory provisions that are designed to further both goals 
simultaneously. The APA includes provisions that are designed to confer a high degree of independence 
on hearing examiners by regulating the agency processes of managing and removing hearing examiners. 
But it also includes a provision that ensures that agencies retain complete control of the policy 
implications of adjudicatory hearings by conferring on the agency the authority to substitute the agency’s 
decision for the initial decision of the hearing examiner. Except for some changes in terminology and 
compensation, Congress has not made material changes in those provisions since Congress enacted them 
in 1946.  
In the APA, Congress gave agencies the power to appoint hearing examiners, 5 U.S.C. § 3105. In 
1972, the Civil Service Commission changed the name of hearing examiners to administrative law judges 
(ALJs). Change of Title to Administrative Law Judge, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (Aug. 19, 1972).  In 1978, Congress 
ratified that decision by statute. Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 187 (1978). (In the remainder of these 
comments I will use the terms hearing examiner and ALJ interchangeably.) Congress also reallocated the 
responsibilities of the Civil Service Commission among three new agencies--the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM), the Federal Labor Relations Authority, and the Merit Systems Protection Board 
(MSPB). Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978).  
Congress limited agency power to manage hearing examiners in several ways that are designed 




entities involved in adjudications. Congress’s goal was to reduce the risk of pro-agency bias by the person 
presiding at an adjudicatory hearing by precluding agencies from using managerial tools as means of 
inducing hearing examiners to conduct hearings in ways that favor the agency and disfavor the private 
parties who are on the other side. Thus, the employing agency cannot discipline a hearing examiner, 5 
U.S.C. § 7521; cannot determine the compensation of a hearing examiner, 5 U.S.C. § 5372; cannot assign 
a case to a hearing examiner except in rotation, 5 U.S.C. § 3105; cannot assign a hearing examiner any 
duties that are inconsistent with the duties and responsibilities of a hearing examiner, 5 U.S.C. § 3105; 
and cannot subject a hearing examiner to supervision or direction by any agency employee who engages 
in “the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2).  
Finally, and most important, a disciplinary action can be taken against an ALJ “only for good cause 
established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) on the record after 
opportunity for hearing before the Board.” 5 U.S.C. § 7521. (In the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 
Congress reallocated the responsibility to implement the APA provision that limits the power of an agency 
to remove or otherwise discipline an ALJ from the Civil Service Commission to the MSPB). Thus, although 
an agency can initiate a proceeding against an ALJ, only the independent MSPB can impose any form of 
discipline against him or her.  
At the same time that Congress protected the integrity of the hearing process by conferring a high 
degree of independence on hearing examiners, Congress ensured that agencies retained complete control 
over the legal basis and policy content of any decision in an adjudication. Congress accomplished that goal 
by providing that a hearing examiner can make only an initial decision and that the agency has complete 
discretion to replace it: “On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers 
which it would have in making the initial decision.” 5. U.S.C. § 557(b). The Supreme Court has reinforced 
that congressional decision by holding that the initial decision qualifies only as part of the record on which 
the court must base its review. Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496-497 (1951).     
Shortly after Congress enacted the APA, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions regarding 
the qualified independence of hearing examiners in which it praised the APA and urged Congress to use 
it as a model for all agency decision-making. In Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 
128 (1953), the Court upheld the initial rules issued by the Civil Service Commission to govern the 
compensation and tenure of hearing examiners, and the rules governing assignment of cases to hearing 
examiners.  It did so over an objection by an association of hearing examiners that the rules were not 
adequately protective of their independent status that the APA was enacted to protect.   
The six-Justice majority described the reasons Congress conferred a high degree of independence 
on hearing examiners in the APA: “Many complaints were voiced against the actions of hearing examiners, 
it being charged that they were mere tools of the agency concerned and subservient to the agency heads 
in making their proposed findings of fact and recommendations.” Id. at 131. The majority described 
studies that supported the complaints of bias and that urged Congress to make hearing examiners 
“partially independent of the agency by which they were employed.” Id. at 131. The majority then 
described the congressional deliberations about the best ways of accomplishing that agreed-upon goal, 
and described with apparent approval the treatment of hearing examiners in the APA: “Several proposals 
were considered, and in the final bill Congress provided that hearing examiners should be given 
independence and tenure in the existing Civil Service system.” Id. at 131-32.     
The majority’s description of the APA’s treatment of hearing examiners and its characterization 
of the status of hearing examiners left no doubt that the majority understood and approved of the 




Congress intended to make hearing examiners ‘a special class of semi-independent 
subordinate hearing officers’ by vesting control of their compensation, promotion and 
tenure in the Civil Service Commission to a much greater extent than in the case of other 
federal employees. Id. at 132.  
The majority upheld the Civil Service rules based on its conclusion that the rules were consistent with 
congressional intent:   
The position of hearing examiner is not a constitutionally protected position. It is a 
creature of congressional enactment. The respondents have no vested right to positions 
as examiners. They hold their posts by such tenure as Congress sees fit to give them. Their 
positions may be regulated completely by Congress, or Congress may delegate the 
exercise of its regulatory power, under proper standards, to the Civil Service Commission, 
which it has done in his case. Id. at 133.   
  
The three dissenting Justices also implicitly approved of the congressional decision to confer 
qualified independence on hearing examiners. However, they would have held the rules invalid because 
of their belief that the rules should have gone even further in conferring qualified independence on 
hearing examiners:   
The Administrative Procedure Act was designed to give trial examiners in the various 
administrative agencies a new status of freedom from agency control. Henceforth they 
were to be ‘very nearly the equivalent of judges even though operating within the Federal 
system of administrative justice.’ Agencies were stripped of power to remove examiners 
working with them. Henceforth removal could be effected only after hearings by the Civil 
Service Commission. That same Commission was empowered to prescribe an examiner’s 
compensation independently of recommendations or ratings by the agency in which the 
examiner worked. And to deprive regulatory agencies of all power to pick particular 
examiners for particular cases, § 11 of the Act commanded that examiners be ‘assigned 
to cases in rotation so far as practicable * * *.’ I agree with the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals that the regulations here sustained go a long way toward frustrating the 
purposes of Congress to give examiners independence. Id. at 144 (citation omitted) 
(Black, J., dissenting).  
The Court was even more forceful in its approval of, and praise for, the congressional decision to 
confer a high degree of independence on hearing examiners in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 
(1950). The question before the Court was whether the APA provisions applicable to hearing examiners 
applied to deportation proceedings. The Court held that they did even though no statute explicitly made 
the APA applicable to those hearings.    
The Court began by describing the widespread complaints of bias that led to the enactment of the 
APA and to its treatment of hearing examiners as independent of the agencies at which they preside. It 
also cited to the many studies that had substantiated those complaints and that had urged statutory 
changes to reduce the pro-agency bias. It then described the years of study and deliberation that led to 
enactment of the APA by unanimous votes in both Houses of Congress. Id. at 37-45. The Court summarized 
the process through which the APA was enacted: “The Act thus represents a long period of study and 
strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing 




   The Court then compared the unfair and biased hearing that the government had provided in 
the case before the Court with the hearing before an impartial hearing examiner that the APA requires. 
Id. at 45-47. The Court even suggested that the Constitution might compel an agency to use the APA 
hearing procedures:   
The constitutional requirement of procedural due process of law derives from the same 
source as Congress’ power to legislate and, where applicable, permeates every valid 
enactment of that body…   
We would hardly attribute to Congress a purpose to be less scrupulous about the fairness 
of a hearing necessitated by the Constitution than one granted by it as a matter of 
expediency.  
   
Indeed, to so construe the Immigration Act might again bring it into constitutional 
jeopardy. When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a 
tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality. Id. at 49-50.  
 The Court concluded that the APA represented an effort by Congress to set forth the “currently 
prevailing standards of impartiality” and thereby to codify the minimum requirements of due process. 
Id. at 50. Based on that conclusion, the Court held that the provisions in the APA relating to hearing 
examiners applied to deportation proceedings. Id. at 51. In later cases, the Court relied on the reasoning 
in Wong Yang Sung as the basis to hold that the APA applies to hearings under the Interstate Commerce 
Act, Riss & Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 907 (1951), and to Post Office fraud hearings, Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 
804 (1952).    
The Court eventually retreated from its suggestion that the APA codified due process when 
Congress explicitly rejected that interpretation of the Act in the process of enacting a deportation statute 
that authorized hearings that fell short of the procedural safeguards reflected in the APA. Marcello v. 
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). But the Court never retreated from its belief that the APA adjudication 
provisions created a model of fairness by which all other agency adjudicatory procedures should be 
judged. Indeed, the Court upheld the procedures Congress authorized in deportation proceedings largely 
because it believed that Congress was “drawing liberally on the analogous provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act and adapting them to the deportation process.” Id. at 310. 
 The vast majority of adjudications in which agencies decide whether to impose a civil penalty are 
presided over by ALJs who are assured a high degree of decisional independence by the APA. In some 
other types of adjudications, Congress has departed from the APA model by conferring the power to 
preside on Administrative Judges (AJs) who lack the assurances of decisional independence that ALJs have. 
The circumstances in which Congress chose to assign responsibility to preside in agency adjudications to 
AJs rather than to ALJs are described in detail in Kent Barnett, et al., Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal 
Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight and Removal, Administrative Conference of the United States 
(2018); Paul Verkuil, et al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary, Administrative Conference of the United 
States (1992). 
B. The Department of Justice Is Jeopardizing the Independence of ALJs 
 In several cases the Solicitor General (SG) of the United States and the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
are attempting to persuade courts to reduce the decisional independence of ALJs. DOJ and the SG are 
arguing that the statute that protects ALJs from being removed except for cause is unconstitutional unless 




ALJs. This is creating a situation in which no one is defending the constitutionality of the statute that 
assures that ALJs will serve as unbiased adjudicators. 
 I have attached as an Appendix to these comments the amicus brief that I and several of my 
colleagues just filed in one of these cases, Fleming v. Department of Agriculture, D.C. Circuit Docket 
Number 17-1246. As you can see, DOJ is refusing to defend the constitutionality of the statutory provision 
that protects ALJs from being removed by an agency head at will. This is an extremely short-sighted 
position to take. If DOJ is successful, its actions will undermine the rights of regulated firms to have their 
disputes with agencies adjudicated by unbiased decision makers. It is easy to predict a resulting return to 
the conditions of the 1930s when ALJs presided in ways that reflected a powerful bias in favor of agencies 
and against regulated firms. 
C. The Supreme Court Has Issued Decisions that Jeopardize the Independence of Agency Adjudicators             
In Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), the Supreme Court held that Administrative Law Judges 
(ALJs) at the SEC are inferior officers rather than employees. That holding probably means that all 2000 
ALJs and many thousand administrative judges (AJs) are inferior officers. In Edmond v. U.S., 520 U.S. 651 
(1997), the Court held that an officer is an inferior officer only if he is inferior to a principal officer who is 
nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. He must be inferior in two ways—his decisions 
must be reviewable by a principal officer and he must be removable by a principal officer. When Congress 
drafted the statutes that apply to agency adjudications it had no idea that the Court would 
decide Lucia and Edmond as it did. Many of those statutes create decision making structures that are 
unconstitutional as a result of those two holdings. 
The statute that creates the decision making structure at the Patent and Trademark Appeals 
Board (PTAB) illustrates the problem. Hundreds of Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) have the power to 
make decisions with respect to the validity of patents. Their decisions are not reviewable by anyone. The 
Federal Circuit held that the PTAB decision making structure is unconstitutional in Arthrex v. Smith & 
Nephew, 941 F. 3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Since the court believed that it could not add to the statute a 
right to obtain review of an APJ decision by a principal officer, the court concluded that it could save the 
statute from a holding that it is unconstitutional only by making all APJs removable at will by a principal 
officer. The court held that even the statutory provision that provides a modest degree of protection from 
arbitrary removal for most civil servants cannot be applied to APJs. 
The House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property held a hearing on the Arthrex opinion. There 
was broad agreement among the members and the witnesses that the result of the Arthrex decision was 
unacceptable because it created a situation in which the Director of PTAB could tell an APJ that he must 
decide a case in a particular way or risk removal by the Director. University of Virginia Law Professor John 
Duffy identified three ways in which the statute could be amended to eliminate the fatal flaw that the 
Federal Circuit identified. Congress could confer the power to review APJ decisions on the Director, who 
is a principal officer; it could create a multi-member board comprised of principal officers and confer 
review power on the board; or, it could make all of the hundreds of APJs principal officers who must be 
nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. 
ALJs at the Department of Agriculture provide another example. As a result of a statute enacted 
in 1940, ALJ decisions at DOA are reviewed only by a “Judicial Officer” who is not nominated by the 
president and confirmed by the Senate. In Fleming v. DOA, D.C. Circuit Docket No. 17-1246, the petitioner 
is arguing that the DOA ALJ who presided in its case was unconstitutionally appointed because his 




Merits Systems Protection Board. The petitioner is likely to win under Edmond, thereby creating a 
situation analogous to the situation of the hundreds of APJs at PTAB. 
Many other agency decision making structures have similar constitutional flaws. Decisions of 
ALJs at the Social Security Administration (SSA) are reviewable by the Social Security Appeals Council. 
The members of the Council are not principal officers. Thus, the 1600 SSA ALJs are also in a situation 
analogous to the hundreds of APJs at PTAB. 
Decisions of Immigration Judges (IJs) are reviewable by the Board of Immigration Appeals, but the 
members of the Board are not nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. IJ decisions are 
also reviewable, in theory, by the Attorney General (AG). In fact, however, the AG cannot possibly review 
more than a tiny fraction of the decisions of IJs. The Department of Justice requires each of the hundreds 
of IJs to decide 700 cases per year in an effort to reduce the backlog of 1,100,000 pending cases. If 
the Edmond test requires actual review rather than merely theoretical review, IJs are also in a situation 
analogous to the hundreds of APJs at PTAB. 
Unless Congress amends the statutes applicable to APJs at PTAB, ALJs at DOA, ALJs at SSA, and IJs, 
courts are likely to agree with the reasoning of the Federal Circuit in Arthrex and hold that all of those 
judges must be removable at will. That would eliminate any conceivable argument that they have the 
degree of decisional independence required to comply with due process. 
Thus, Congress must amend many of the statutes that govern adjudicative decision making at the 
many agencies that have statutorily-mandated decision making structures that violate the constitution as 
the Supreme Court interpreted it in Lucia and Edmond.  Any of the three types of amendments that 
Professor Duffy recommended for the PTAB statute would be effective at any of the other agencies that 
are in a situation analogous to that of PTAB. 
This is the point at which political polarity becomes a formidable obstacle, however. It has become 
nearly impossible for Congress to enact or to amend a statute. It seems unlikely that Congress will be able 
to amend all of the statutes that now create decision making structures that are unconstitutional in a 
timely manner. In any context in which Congress is unable to accomplish that daunting task, a court is 
likely to follow the lead of the Federal Circuit and to hold that the judges at that agency must be subject 
to at will removal. That, in turn, will create a situation in which those judges do not have any degree of 
decisional independence from the agencies at which they preside. We could easily find ourselves in a 
situation in which over a million cases per year are decided in a decision making environment that lacks 
one of the most important safeguards of due process—an unbiased decision maker. 
Political polarity also creates another serious obstacle to the kinds of changes in decision making 
structure that are required to comply with Lucia and Edmond. Amendments that add enough principal 
officers to review the millions of decisions made by the judges whose decisions are not now subject to 
review by a principal officer would add scores of principal officers to the approximately 1200 agency 
officials who now must be nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Amendments that 
make those judges principal officers would more than double the number of agency officials who must be 
nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. 
As Stanford University Law Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell has documented in detail, political 
polarity has created a situation in which the process of nomination and confirmation has gotten slower in 
every administration. It is so slow now that we have a large number of vacancies in many important 
positions. It seems highly unlikely that the process of appointment and confirmation would be able to 





I am confident that the Supreme Court was not aware of the effects of its decisions 
in Lucia and Edmond when it made those decisions. Now that those effects have become apparent, it 
should reconsider the tests that apply to determine whether an ALJ or an AJ is an officer or an inferior 
officer in light of the disastrous effects of the tests that it applied in Lucia and Edmond. In the meantime 
Congress will have to amend many statutes to create decision making structures that are consistent 
with Lucia and Edmond. Courts can help Congress make the needed changes and they can help agencies 
adjust to those changes by following the lead of the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
After holding that the initial structure of the Federal Election Commission was unconstitutional, the Court 
gave Congress thirty days to amend the statute to create a structure that is constitutional. 
D. The Process of Appointing Agency Adjudicators Must Be Improved 
 Until 2018, ALJs were part of the Competitive Service of the Civil Service. They were chosen 
through a multi-step process that included evaluation of their experience and suitability to be judges. The 
first part of the decision making process was implemented by the OPM. It used a combination of 
evaluative tools that included a test that was designed by psychologists to determine whether applicants 
have the kind of temperament that allows someone to engage in unbiased adjudication of disputes. OPM 
decided which applicants were suitable for appointment and ranked each based on the applicant’s 
performance in the evaluation process. OPM put everyone who achieved a passing score in the evaluative 
process on a register in the order in which they ranked through application of the competitive evaluation 
process. Agencies then had the discretion to appoint a new ALJ by choosing one of the three candidates 
on the register who had attained the highest score in the competitive evaluation process.           
In Lucia v. SEC, 138 S.Ct. 2044 (2018), the Supreme Court held that ALJs at the SEC are “inferior 
officers” who must be appointed by agency heads. That holding probably applies to all ALJs and AJs. 
Immediately after the Court handed down its decision, President Trump issued Executive Order 13843, 
Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service (July 10, 2018). That order abolished 
the OPM selection process and the registry that OPM had created through use of that process. It 
announced that the only national qualification to be an ALJ is membership in good standing in a State Bar. 
The order authorized agencies to add qualifications for appointment to their agencies and empowered 
agency heads to appoint anyone who satisfies the national and agency-based qualifications. 
Executive Order 13843 creates an appointment process that has the potential to bring back the 
kind of systemically biased decision making process that infected the agency adjudicative process prior to 
the statutory reforms of that process in 1946. Agencies are now free to appoint ALJs who are virtually 
certain to conduct adjudications in ways that favor regulatory agencies and disfavor regulated firms.  
The President should issue a new Executive Order that eliminates that risk. The new Executive 
Order should authorize OPM to apply appropriate criteria to applicants for positions as ALJs to assure that 
they are likely to conduct adjudications in a fair and unbiased manner. OPM should then compile a list of 
applicants who have been determined to be qualified to be ALJs from which agency heads can choose in 
making decisions to appoint ALJs. 
Conclusion 
As I have explained in meticulous detail, the process of adjudication of regulatory disputes that 
was created unanimously by Congress in 1946 and praised in several unanimous decisions of the Supreme 
Court in the 1950s is fair and unbiased in all respects. The only threats to that system have come from 




The fair and unbiased system for adjudication of regulatory disputes that we have today contrasts 
starkly with the horribly biased system for adjudicating immigration disputes that exists today. That 
system is a national disgrace. It violates the most basic principles of due process in many respects. See Jill 
Family, Immigration Adjudication Bankruptcy, 21 Penn. J. Con. L. 1025 (2019).           
                                       
                                                    
